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1. Introduction
Comparative advertising, in which the advertised brand is explicitly compared with
one or more competing brands, has become popular in recent years.1 For the United
States, Muehling et al. (1990) note that around 40 percent of all advertising is com-
parative. According to Pechmann and Steward (1990) around 80 percent of all ads are
comparative: 60 percent are indirectly comparative ads and 20 percent are directly
comparative ads, whereas the remaining 20 percent are non-comparative. Sectors in
which comparative advertising is frequently used include food, retail and motoring,
which all rely heavily on aggressive marketing strategies. The upsurge of comparative
advertising contrasts with previous attitudes of advertisers. In the United States,
no law has prevented the use of comparative advertising. However, due to concerns
about possible misidenti…cation of the sponsoring brand and fear of consumers’ mis-
trust, advertisers were reluctant to use it. They also believed that some long-term
consequences of comparison advertising may be seriously detrimental to all advertising
(Wilkie and Farris 1975, Prasad 1976). Indeed, also some recent marketing literature
on comparative advertising is skeptical about its e¤ectiveness (see Pechmann and
Ratneshwar 1991, Jain et al. 1998, Barone and Miniard 1999).
The relatively sudden increase, during the 1970s, in the use of explicit comparisons
in advertising, was in part a result of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sanction of
such a technique as a means of improving competition. Although this was not publi-
cized as an o¢cial position, it was argued that direct comparison ads would encourage
consumers to make more informed purchasing decisions—moreover, comparison ads
would ease the consumer’s task of evaluating the performance of particular brands
against other brands.
A well known explanation of advertising as a rational phenomenon hinges upon the
idea that spending money is a way to signal a high quality of a brand (Nelson 1976).
The signaling explanation, as advanced by Nelson, …lled a gap in the understanding of
a controversial economic phenomenon like apparently wasteful advertising campaigns.
The argument, that was meant to apply to the case of generic advertising, was that
the cost and not the content of an ad is what really matters (see also Milgrom and
Roberts 1986). However, the argument so far cannot answer the question why a …rm
may want to choose to spend money in comparison rather than generic advertising.
We note in the …rst place that generic and comparative advertising do di¤er in their
content. More importantly, they open up di¤erent strategic opportunities for rivals
to the launch of an ad.
Indeed, the law in many countries erects barriers against unfair use of comparison
1A distinction is made between direct and indirect comparative advertising. In direct comparative
claims the advertised brands is described as superior to named competitors on speci…c attributes or
bene…ts, including price. (A 1999 General Motors Corp. ad claimed that the Cadillac Seville STS
outperforms the BMW 540 in a slalom course. Other well-known examples of direct comparative ads
concern the following brands: Coke and Pepsi, Burger King and McDonald’s, Unilever and Procter
and Gamble, Avis and Hertz (see David Teather in Marketing ; London; May 11, 2000), Oracle and
IBM). On the contrary, in indirect comparative claims, competitors are not named and the advertised
brand is described as being superior on speci…c attributes or bene…ts.
The distinction between direct and indirect comparative ads is not relevant in the present model
because only two …rms (the advertising …rm and its competitor) exist.
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advertising. Today, in the U.S., federal advertising legislation is found in two major
laws: the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Trademark (Lanham) Act (which
prohibits the use of false designations of origin and false or misleading descriptions of
facts). (See Shy 1995). Moreover, when advertising is comparative, lawsuit may be
followed by signi…cant …nes and damages.2 Frequently, the court simply imposes to
the advertising …rm to cease a campaign.
The European Union began to address the issue of comparison advertising in the
late 1970s. The position was that comparison advertising should be legal if it provides
veri…able details and is neither misleading nor unfair. However, practice was markedly
di¤erent among member states and laws on comparative advertising were harmonized
only in April 2000. According to current European legislation “comparative adver-
tising is allowed only if it is not misleading, compares like with like, does not create
confusion, discredit or take unfair advantage of a rival’s trademark or present goods
as imitations of those bearing a protected trade name”.
It appears, therefore, important that rivals can legally persecute a …rm using
misleading comparisons, especially if they are explicitly named. For the advertising
…rm the danger to be persecuted is much lower when generic advertising is used.3
Also, we note that a general agreement exists in the advertising literature con-
cerning the fact that a low-share or unfamiliar brand can enhance the relevance of
an ad by naming a leading brand that consumers regularly purchase (Muehling et
al. 1990, Pechmann and Stewart 1990). For example, citing the words of the dealer
marketing manager at Mitsubishi, the company used comparative advertising when
entering the European market, “to guide the consumer by making associations with
top brand names” (Director ; London; June, 2000; Alison Coleman). In line with this
widespread idea, we base our theory on a model of a market where an incumbent
competes against an entrant. The incumbent sells a product of known quality, while
the entrant’s quality is yet unknown to consumers and dissipative advertising is used
as a signal of quality. Moreover, as we shall motivate further, in our model both …rms
know more about the entrant’s quality than consumers do.4
2 In 1999 U-Haul International claimed the comparative advertising campaign undertaken by the
Jartran do-it-yourself moving company was false and sued Jartran for violating the Lanham Act.
The court sustained U-Haul’s complaint and awarded $40 million in damages. Notice that it is
generally di¢cult to prove that consumers are really misled by an ad. This problem was solved by
the court ruling that if a marketer spends “substantial funds” in an advertising campaign, the court
will presume that consumers were misled if the ad is determined to be false. In 2000 a federal judge
ruled that Papa John’s must pay over $468,000 in damages to Pizza Hut and cease and desist from
using its tag line “Better ingredients. Better pizza.” The judge ruled in favor of Pizza Hut, as the
ingredient comparison was misleading. In fact the claim cannot be scienti…cally substantiated nor
taste tests exist that prove a statistically signi…cant preference for Papa John’s product.
3An example that shows in which sense a comparative ads makes the advertiser more vulnerable,
is what the US law de…nes as “pu¤ery”. An ad can be considered a pu¤ery as long as “the customer
believes the commercial statement is so vague, ridiculous or opinionated that it could not possibly be
taken serious” (for a clear explanation see Brandweek, New York; May 2001, Jim Edwards). Pu¤ery
is accepted in generic advertising but it becomes illegal whenever it tags a competitor, exactly as in
the case of Papa John’s ad “Better ingredients better pizza”.
4We could extend our model to situations in which the entrant is uncertain whether its product …ts
well the consumers’ tastes while consumers have this information. In this situation …rms have initially
di¤erent information than consumers (not more). Our insights concerning the role of comparative
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We assume that the entrant’s pro…ts are positively related to the quality of its
product as perceived by consumers. Then a low quality entrant is interested in mim-
icking a high quality one.
In the model, to signal quality, the entrant can choose among generic or compar-
ative advertising. If advertising is comparative, the entrant says explicitly that its
quality is not lower than the incumbent’s. The latter has the possibility to react to a
comparative ad by applying to court. Thus, from the viewpoint of the entrant, choice
of comparative advertising empowers the rival with the right to sue; generic does not.
This implies that money spent in misleading comparative advertising is more risky
for the entrant than money spent in generic advertising: if a lawsuit follows the court
may impose damages. In addition, when an adverse court ruling becomes publicly
known, consumers will revise their perceived quality of the advertised product. As
a …rst insight, therefore, if the entrant uses comparative instead of generic ads it
chooses to give the incumbent the right to take action, and therefore consumers infer
that it must think to have a strong case. Note that, this is consistent with practi-
tioners’s point of view on the use of comparative advertising. On the web site of the
advertising agency Kaye&Company (http:nnwww.kayeco.com, consulted May 2001)
the use of comparative advertising is encouraged because it increases credibility for
the advertised product: “Side-by-side or ‘A-B’ comparisons can provide prospective
customers with compelling reasons to buy from you. They can also help build credi-
bility for your product. Subconsciously, the prospective customer says: -Who would
risk making a direct comparison if they didn’t have something truly superior?-”.
To capture di¤erent features of the real world, we use a simple Bayesian game,
in two versions. In both versions of the model we assume that both …rms observe
the same imperfect signal about the entrant’s quality that can take only two values:
”good” or ”bad”. This allows us to analyze in which way the entrant’s strategy and the
incumbent’s reactions depend on the signal precision. (The assumption that the two
signals to the …rms are perfectly correlated is relaxed in section 6). The two versions
of the model di¤er with respect to the consumers’ information acquisition. In the …rst
model, model A, (in section 4 below), consumers observe what type of advertising has
been chosen and how much is spent on it, but they do not observe the incumbent’s
action and any judgement by the court. In the second model, or model B, (in section
5 below), consumers also observe the incumbent’s action and the judgement by the
court; consumers then can make their purchasing decision depending on the court’s
verdict, knowing that the court’s ruling may be wrong.
Model A …ts reality when consumers are not perfectly aware of …rms’ legal actions;
for instance because these are not broadly discussed by the media or because pur-
chasing decisions are made before any legal action is taken. Model B applies where
consumers not only observe the incumbent’s reaction but also the court’s verdict.
There, if the incumbent sues the entrant, consumers can update their beliefs on qual-
ity after the court’s ruling. Note that in contrast to the …rst model, in this case the
court’s precision is important in that the court’s …ndings a¤ect consumer beliefs.
The results in both versions of the model point that comparative advertising can
be a more powerful signal than generic advertising. In particular, the …rst can be
advertising appear to be robust to this extension.
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used as a signal in situations in which the second cannot - for instance, when the high
quality entrant also has higher production costs than the low quality. In that case,
indeed, existence of equilibria with generic advertising is ruled out.
We study in detail also the case when both type of advertising can arise at a
subgame perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. We explicitly show that if the
legal costs to be paid by the incumbent are not in excess of the damages it may
receive, both generic and comparison ads can arise. However, in particular if the
correlation between the good signal and high quality is large enough, comparative
advertising is easily singled out as the preferred type of advertising in the unique
equilibrium. We make use of the dominance selection criterion. Basically, dominance
applies here because the minimum amount of “money burning” necessary to separate
under comparative advertising is lower than the corresponding amount under generic
advertising, due to the possible damage payments.
In this last respect some features of the equilibria with comparative advertising
are worth emphasizing. Comparative advertising appears in two types of equilibria:
the …rst where the incumbent sues the entrant also when it receives the good signal
about the entrant’s quality. Damages can be paid along this equilibrium path. The
second where the incumbent only sues the entrant if the signal it receives is bad.
This accommodating behavior occurs when the good signal is highly correlated with
high quality. Damages are not paid along this equilibrium path. Therefore, the
incumbent’s right to …le for damages reduces the cost of advertising for the entrant,
even if this right is not exercised along the equilibrium path.
It is noteworthy that the …rst model shows that comparative advertising can be
more e¢cient (less costly) than generic advertising even if consumers are not informed
on the incumbent’s actual strategy choice, and on the court’s verdict. In the second
model results show that comparative advertising not only can be less costly than
generic advertising, but it can also be more informative, thanks to the revelation of
the court’s (imprecise) …ndings to the public. Moreover the higher signaling potential
of comparative advertising is compatible with a damage level equal to zero. This is
in line with empirical evidence that courts often rule that an advertising be stopped,
without imposing damages.
Within the framework of model B, we also analyze the case where the court does
not make mistakes, and the …rms receive imperfectly correlated signals. There we
see that the observation of the incumbent’s choice of strategy, whatever it is, reveals
additional information to consumers.
To our knowledge the economics literature has rather neglected the analysis of
comparative advertising as providing explicit information about quality. Shy (1992)
and (1995) focus on the matching of heterogeneous consumers with di¤erentiated
brands, where the brand producing …rms dynamically compete on market shares. In
his model the two …rms can use either non-comparative or comparative advertising. In
Shy’s terms, a non-comparative advertising is ‘persuasive’ since it is aimed to attract
new users. In contrast a comparative advertising is ‘informative’ and is targeted to
experienced users: it is used to inform those consumers who have already purchased
the product before, about the di¤erence between their ideal brand and what they have
purchased in the past. Garella and Peitz (2000b) focus upon exclusionary practices
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and brie‡y mention that their model may also apply to comparative advertising. In
that context, when the entrant can choose to produce either low or high quality
the incumbent can use comparison ads to vehicle useful information to consumers.
However, as we said, it has been claimed that comparative advertising is used by and
useful to entrants more than to incumbents.
In Matthews and Fertig (1990) an incumbent and an entrant can use dissipative
generic advertising to signal the entrant’s quality. Similar to our model, their model
allows for a reaction by the incumbent to the entrant’s advertising decision in the form
of a counteradvertising campaign. However, their model is markedly di¤erent from
our model of comparative advertising mainly because in their model the incumbent’s
strategy space is not a¤ected by the entrant’s advertising decision.
The present paper is also related to the literature on advertising and market
entry (Bagwell and Ramey (1988, 1990) and Linnemer (1998)). In these models the
advertising strategy is undertaken by the incumbent to deter entry.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, we show by example the signaling
potential of comparative advertising. In section 3 we present the model. In section 4
we analyze in detail model A. We obtain unique equilibria using standard equilibrium
re…nements. In section 5 we analyze model B. In section 6 we analyze a variant of
model B in which the information of the two …rms is not perfectly correlated. Section
7 concludes.
2. An illustration of the signaling potential of comparative ad-
vertising
In this section we provide a simple example of the signaling potential of comparative
advertising.
An established and a new …rm operate in a market. Consumers do not know the
product quality of the new …rm, whereas both …rms do. The entrant’s quality is either
high (H) or low (L). Producing high quality leads to …xed costs F , producing low
quality leads to zero …xed costs, while variable costs are zero for both qualities. It is
commonly known which quality the established …rm o¤ers. Without loss of generality,
it is assumed that this quality is high. Pro…ts of the established …rm depend on its
own quality (always H) and consumer beliefs about the product quality of the new
…rm qe. Given high quality of the established …rm its reduced pro…ts are written as
¦I(qe). Given the quality of the established …rm pro…ts of the new …rm depend on its
true quality qE and its perceived quality qe. Reduced pro…ts are written as ¦E(qe; q).
Note in particular that ¦E(qe;H) = ¦E(qe; L) ¡ F . The established …rm’s pro…ts
are decreasing in the competitor’s perceived quality. In particular, ¦I(L) > ¦I(H).
The new …rm makes higher pro…ts the higher its perceived quality. In particular,
¦E(H; q) > ¦E(L; q).
The two …rms play the following game in extensive form: Stage 1: Nature chooses
the product quality of the new …rm (for illustration: quality H with probability
1/2, and L with probability 1/2). Both …rms observe the quality of the new …rm,
consumers do not. Stage 2: The entrant decides among the set of advertising types
fc; g; ng, namely comparative, generic, or no advertising respectively. Associated costs
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are Ac, Ag and 0, respectively. We assume, for simplicity, that after choosing g or c
the advertising cost is unavoidable and can only take a given value Ac = Ag = ~A; this
emphasizes that technically the two types of advertising di¤er only in the ”wording”
of the message. Stage 3: If the new …rm uses comparative advertising the established
…rm decides whether to make a complaint to court, paying legal costs C. The court
veri…es the quality of the new …rm and thus whether its claim was justi…ed. If it
was not justi…ed the new …rm has to pay damages D. Stage 4: Firms set prices (or
quantities). Stage 5: Consumers observe the decisions on stages 1 to 4 (including the
court verdict) and update their beliefs concerning the product quality of the new …rm
based on the actions in stages 2 and 3. Then they make their purchasing decisions.
We make the assumption that the new …rm gains from generic advertising if this
makes consumers believe in high quality, ¦E(H; q)¡ ~A > ¦E(L; q). While this makes
generic ads possibly attractive, it also implies that there does not exist a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which the new …rm uses generic advertising5.
Does comparative advertising su¤er the same fate? Not necessarily. Suppose that
using comparative advertising (choosing c at stage 2) makes consumers believe in high
quality unless the court verdict contradicts the advertising claims. The separating
constraint for a high type entrant is ¦E(H;H) ¡ ~A > ¦E(L;H). Suppose furthermore
that the established …rm makes higher pro…ts unmasking its competitor to be of low
quality and receiving damages than it would make under high quality beliefs, namely
¦I(L)¡C+D > ¦I(H). When the incumbent reacts to a false claim, the separating
constraint for an entrant of type L is ¦E(L;L) ¡ ~A¡D · ¦E(L;L), which is trivially
veri…ed. Since ¦I(L) > ¦I(H) holds by assumption, a separating equilibrium with
comparative advertising exists if D > C and for su¢ciently low cost of advertising,
namely for ¦E(H;H) ¡¦E(L;H) > ~A. This is the only possible separating perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
The general idea behind the example is that comparative advertising triggers
strategic interaction between informed parties. This interaction allows the uniformed
party (consumers) to infer about the realization of an unobservable variable (product
quality). There are two channels through which the incumbent’s strategy may help
the entrant. First, the choice of comparative advertising is interpreted as a stronger
signal than generic because it would lead to legal action and payment of damages in
case of cheating. Further, the observation of the informed incumbent not reacting to
comparative claims is interpretable as good news about the entrant’s quality. The
…rst channel may operate with or without the second as it shall be clear from the
analysis in the following sections.
5At a separating equilibrium type L uses n and type H chooses g and forcibly pays ~A. The
separation constraint for the low type is ¦E(L;L) ¸ ¦E(H;L) ¡ ~A. For the high type it is:
¦E(L;H) · ¦E(H;H) ¡ ~A . Therefore, a separating equilibrium could exist only if the interval
¦E(H;L)¡¦E(L;L) · ~A · ¦E(H;H)¡¦E(L;H) was not empty, which is impossible considering
that the assumption on the cost of quality implies ¦E(qe;H) = ¦E(qe; L)¡ F .
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3. The model
In the introductory example, by generic advertising the entrant cannot signal its
quality and comparative advertising prevails. This seems to be an extreme result.
We shall now consider a model that gives more realistic predictions and explain the
choice between generic and comparative advertising when both can potentially provide
a signal of quality.
As in the example, we only make assumptions on reduced pro…t functions and we
shall maintain the assumption that the incumbent (I) is known to be of high quality.6
The entrant’s (E) quality can be either high (q = H) or low (q = L). We denote
¦E(q
e; q) the gross pro…ts of an entrant with true quality q whose perceived quality is
qe. Therefore, for instance, ¦E (H;L) and ¦E (L;H) respectively denote gross pro…ts
of a low and high quality entrant whose quality is wrongly perceived. In the same
way ¦I(qe; q) denote pro…ts of the incumbent dependent on the entrant’s perceived
and true quality. For a discussion and an example see Subsection 4.3.
We assume that the entrant’s sales and pro…ts are increasing, while the incum-
bent ones are decreasing, in the entrant perceived quality, qe. Thus, the following
inequalities are assumed:
² A.1 ¦E(qe; q) > ¦E(qe0; q) if qe > qe0
² A.2 ¦I(qe; q) < ¦I(qe0; q) if qe > qe0
Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) are standard properties of many oligopoly models
where products have some degree of both, horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation (for
a discussion see Garella and Peitz, 2000a).
Concerning the way product quality a¤ects the entrant’s pro…ts, we will consider
the case where production costs are increasing and the case they are decreasing in
quality_ in the introductory example of section 2 they were constant. If the …xed cost
is independent of quality, the dependence of marginal costs on true quality translates
into the dependence of the entrant’s pro…ts for given perceived quality on true quality:
pro…ts are increasing or decreasing in true quality.
According to Nelson (1974), and as formalized by Milgrom and Roberts (1986),
advertising has no direct impact on utility, demand, or pro…ts. Its only possible
in‡uence is through consumers’ perception of quality. The new feature of our model
is that the content of an ad is important: when the entrant uses generic advertising
it cannot be sued, because claims on product’s attributes are generic. This is clearly
a limit case, nevertheless we do not loose in generality because the probability of the
incumbent’s legal action is surely higher when advertising is comparative than when
it is generic.
The content of advertising and its cost are publicly observable. We assume that
advertising is not needed to inform consumers of the marketed products’ existence;
therefore, if consumers were fully informed concerning the entrant’s quality, the en-
trant would not advertise at all.
6Our results can be extended to the case in which the incumbent is of any known quality.
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In our model incentives to cheat on quality are straightforward: ¦E (qe; L) is an
increasing function of qe.
The entrant’s quality is high with probability ®0 or low with probability 1 ¡ ®0.
Hence, the ex ante expected quality of the entrant is
M0 ´ ®0H + (1¡ ®0)L: (3.1)
Both the incumbent and the entrant observe a signal si 2 fsL; sMg and update their
priors on quality. If the observed signal is sL; both …rms exactly know that the entrant
quality is low. Whereas, if the observed signal is sM ; both …rms know the entrant’s
quality is high with probability ®1 and low with probability 1 ¡ ®1; where ®1 and
1 ¡ ®1 represent updated beliefs (see …gure 1). This particular way to introduce a
noise in the knowledge of …rms can be interpreted as follows. Testing a product allows
a …rm to …nd out that it is of low quality if the test is not successful. However, even
after a series of successful tests there remains a doubt whether the product is indeed
of high quality. We assume for simplicity that the signals received by the two …rms
are perfectly correlated (an analysis of the case with imperfect correlation of signals
is deferred to section 6).
Let ¸ be the probability that the signal sM is observed when the type is low:
¸ = prob(sM j L). By applying Bayes’ rule we …nd:
prob(H j sM) ´ ®1 = ®0
®0 + ¸ (1¡ ®0) > ®0
and 1¡®1 = [¸ (1¡ ®0)] = [¸ (1¡ ®0) + ®0] < 1¡®0: Notice that, for ¸ = 0; observing
the signal si; i = L;M; both …rms perfectly infer the type; while, for ¸ = 1; there is
no updating and the signal is useless. In other words, the lower is ¸, the higher is the
signal precision. After observing the signal sM the expected quality is
M1 ´ ®1H + (1¡ ®1)L: (3.2)
Consumers do not observe the signal and their priors remain ®0 and 1¡ ®0:7
insert …gure 1 here
Advertising. After observing the signal si; the entrant chooses between compara-
tive, generic or no advertising to signal its quality to consumers. Formally, the choice
consists of picking an element in the set fc; g; ng, where c corresponds to comparison
advertising, g to generic, and n to no advertising. After choosing n the entrant has no
cost and no further option to claim a high quality. After choosing c or g the entrant
decides the level of advertising expenditure, denoted respectively Ac or Ag. For ease
of exposition we impose that having chosen c; or g, advertising expenditures must
exceed a nonnegative threshold, Aj ¸ A ¸ 0; j = g; c, where A can be set to zero
7The assumption that an entrant’s quality may not be known to consumers is not new (Farrell
1986) and seems natural for many markets. The assumption that the incumbent has access to the
same information about the competitor’s quality than the entrant itself, while consumers have not,
is certainly admissible for a wide range of cases (see Garella and Peitz 2000b).
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eventually, and is interpreted as a di¤usion cost of advertising which is necessary to
reach consumers.
Lawsuits threats. In the case comparative advertising is undertaken, the incum-
bent’s strategy space, f`; ag, includes the option to go to court; i.e. the decision
whether to …le for a lawsuit, choosing `, or not (accommodate the quality claim),
choosing a. If the entrant chooses g, instead of c, the incumbent cannot …le and its
strategy space is trivially fag.
To simplify the presentation, prices or quantities are not used by consumers to
extract information concerning product quality. Firms observe the true quality (and
related costs) before setting prices or quantities8 (see the example in section 4.3
below). Competition takes place only once so that no repeated purchases occur. This
allows us to concentrate on the signaling role of advertising strategies.
We assume that, by applying to court, the incumbent pays legal costs C, it obtains
veri…cation of the entrant’s quality and receives an indemnity, D, if the claim was
found to be false. No payments are made by the entrant if the entrant is really a high
quality producer.9 The sequence of moves can be summarized as follows:
Stage 1. Nature chooses the type of the entrant (H or L). Firms receive a signal
si 2 fsL; sMg about the entrant’s product quality.
Stage 2. At stage 2.a, the entrant chooses among fc; g; ng and, at stage 2.b, adver-
tising expenditures Aj ¸ A, for j = c; g.
Stage 3: The incumbent can choose among f`; ag if j = c where choice of ` implies
cost C. If the incumbent chooses ` the court becomes active. In case the court
…nds the comparative claim to be wrong the entrant has to pay damages D to
the incumbent.
Stage 4: Competition is resolved (…rms simultaneously choose prices or quantities).
Stage 5: Consumers make purchasing decisions.
Consumers’ information. In model A, (section 4) consumers only observe the
entrant’s advertising strategy — neither do they observe incumbent’s choice at the
third stage among ` and a, nor do they observe the court’s verdict. Thus consumers
update their priors on the entrant’s quality based only upon the observed advertising.
In model B, in Section 5 below, consumes observe the entrant’s and the incumbent’s
strategy and the verdict of the court in a lawsuit. The updating of beliefs is based
upon the …rms’ strategies and upon the verdict.
Using the two models has the advantage of representing two situations that could
arise. In the …rst one, consumers are not able to learn about the existence of a
legal dispute before their purchase is made, or the incumbent’s decision to go to
8A similar simplifying assumption is used in the limit-price models in the vein of Milgrom and
Roberts (1982) where the entrant comes to know the incumbent’s cost after entry and before setting
prices.
9Note that the special case D = C is equivalent to the situation in which the loosing party has
to pay the legal costs.
10
court happens with a delay. In this …rst model court ruling cannot have an e¤ect on
consumers’ information by construction; nevertheless, as we shall show, comparative
advertising can a¤ect consumers’ perceptions. The second model may be relevant
when consumers information about legal procedures spreads quickly and courts are
fast in reaching a verdict. Model B, moreover, allows for studying the role of the
court’s precision, interpreted as decreasing with the likelihood of errors in judgements.
Finally model B is also used to describe a situation where the court’s verdict is always
correct but the …rms’ signals are imperfectly correlated.
We shall use the solution concept of Subgame Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (SPBE).
A SPBE of the game is de…ned as a strategy pro…le such that, given beliefs and equi-
librium strategies of the other players, pro…ts or utilities are maximized at each stage
(in each subgame) and …rms’ and consumers’ beliefs are updated according to Bayes’
rule. An equilibrium is said to be separating when consumers beliefs at equilibrium
allow them to infer the signal received by the two …rms. In particular, we are inter-
ested in separating equilibria where no advertising (n) is used when the signal is sL;
while advertising (c or g) is chosen when signal is sM :
4. Belief revision and the type of advertising
4.1. Separating equilibria
In model A consumers only observe the entrant’s advertising decision, update their
priors on the entrant’s quality, and make the purchasing decision. They do not observe
the …rms’ legal dispute. This means that in terms of the information received by
consumers we consider here the most unfavorable situation for comparative ads. As
we shall see, the risk of actually paying damages when cheating on quality is crucial
for the results in the present section.
De…nition 1. We distinguish three types of separating equilibria, where no adver-
tising, n, is used if the signal is sL:
1. equilibria of type 1, with comparative advertising, c, when the signal is sM , in
which the incumbent …les for a lawsuits whenever comparative advertising is
used;
2. equilibria of type 2, with comparative advertising, c, when the signal is sM , in
which the incumbent …les only if comparative advertising was used in state sL;
3. equilibria of type 3, in which the entrant uses generic advertising, g, when the
signal is sM .
Notice that in both equilibria of type 1 and 2 the incumbent claims damages if
comparative advertising was used in state sL: such reaction represents the incumben-
t’s strategy o¤ the equilibrium path. What distinguish these two types of equilibria is
the incumbent’ reaction in state sM . Equilibria of type 2 are particularly interesting
because the incumbent does not …le for a lawsuit along the equilibrium path: the
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threat of a legal action in state sL is su¢cient to support comparative advertising as
a signaling device.
At a separating equilibrium, if the entrant undertakes an advertising campaign
Aj ¸ A, with j = c; g, consumers learn that the signal sM was observed, they update
their beliefs and form expectations about quality M1 as de…ned by (3.2). Both with
comparative and generic advertising the entrant gains ¦E (M1;H) with probability
®1 and ¦E (M1; L) with probability 1 ¡ ®1; gross of advertising expenditures (and
damages when advertising is comparative and the equilibrium is of type 1).10 Let
¹¦E(M1) ´ ®1¦E (M1;H) + (1¡ ®1)¦E (M1; L)
denote the expected pro…t when it is common knowledge among …rms that the realized
state is sM (recall that this uses the simplifying assumption that …rms know the true
quality when taking price or quantity decisions) and consumers’ up-dated beliefs are
M1. In the same way, let
¹¦E(L) ´ ®1¦E (L;H) + (1¡ ®1)¦E (L;L)
denote expected pro…t when the realized state is sM and no advertising is made such
that the entrant is perceived as a low type producer. When it does not advertise, the
entrant obtains the pro…t ¦E (L;H) if it is a high type, and the pro…t ¦E (L;L) if it
is a low type.
Let us focus …rst on generic advertising, that is on equilibrium of type 3. In case
generic advertising is used, there cannot be any legal claim by the incumbent and the
separating constraint for an entrant who observes the signal sM is:
¹¦E(M1)¡Ag ¸ ¹¦E(L): (4.1)
(4.1) ensures that, when the signal is sM ; the entrant has no interest in mimicking
the state of nature sL by using no advertising.
The separation constraint for an entrant who observes the signal sL is:
¦E (L;L) ¸ ¦E (M1; L)¡Ag (4.2)
(4.2) ensures that, when the signal is sL; the entrant has no interest in mimicking the
state of nature sM by using generic advertising. From (4.2) we …nd the lower bound
for generic advertising, which corresponds to the mimicking gain, denoted bAg:
Ag ¸ ¦E (M1; L)¡¦E (L;L) ´ bAg (4.3)
Putting together (4.1) and (4.2), the condition for the existence of a separating SPBE
with generic advertising expenditure, that is an equilibrium of type 1, is:
¦E (M1; L)¡¦E (L;L) · Ag · ¹¦E(M1)¡ ¹¦E(L) (4.4)
10This follows from the hypothesis on the timing of the incumbent’s reaction so that consumers
do not know the quality of the entrant before they make their purchase.
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Furthermore note that, substituting for ¹¦E(M1) and ¹¦E(L) in (4.4) the interval for
Ag given by (4.4) is non-empty if and only if:
¦E (M1; L)¡¦E (M1;H) · ¦E (M1;H)¡¦E (L;H) : (4.5)
If the cross derivative of ¦E, @2¦E=@qeE@qE, exists for all qualities between L and
H and does not change in sign on this range then condition (4.5) is equivalent to
condition:
C.1
@2¦E(q
e
E; qE)
@qeE@qE
¸ 0
Condition C.1 says that pro…t changes due to changes in the expected quality are non-
decreasing in the true quality of the entrant’s product.11 This condition limits the
scope for generic advertising. Notice that condition C.1 can hold only if the entrant’s
unit costs are non-increasing in quality (assuming that competition is one-shot).12 If,
on the contrary, the entrant’s unit costs are increasing in quality, then C.1 is never
satis…ed and no separating equilibrium with generic advertising can exist. Notice also
that condition C.1 holds with equality if product quality only a¤ects …xed costs or
does not a¤ect costs at all. (For further discussion see the example in section 4.3
below).
Focus now on comparative advertising and equilibria of type 1. Recall that a
type 1 equilibrium has the property that the entrant chooses c if the signal is sM
and, observing c, the incumbent chooses `. The incumbent’s expected pro…t after a
comparative claim in state sM is, if it goes to court:
®1¦I (M1;H) + (1¡ ®1) [¦I (M1; L) +D]¡C:
Let ®1¦I (M1;H)+(1¡®1)¦I (M1; L) ´ ¹¦I(M1). If the signal sM has been observed,
the incumbent …les for damages when observing a comparative ad if the following
condition is veri…ed:
¹¦I(M1)¡C + (1¡ ®1)D ¸ ¹¦I(M1) (4.6)
which can be rewritten as:
®1 · b® ´ (D¡C)=D (4.7)
that is, according to intuition, reaction always occurs when the probability that the
entrant is a high quality producer is low enough. Recall that ®1 is decreasing in ¸;
the “signal precision”. While, if ®1 > b®; the incumbent does not react in state sM .
If the signal sL has been observed, the incumbent chooses ` when observing a
comparative ad if:
¦I(M1; L)¡ C +D ¸ ¦I(M1; L) (4.8)
11When C:1 is veri…ed the so-called ”single crossing condition” is automatically veri…ed.
12 In some markets mandatory warranties exist. Then a low quality can be interpreted as a high
probability of replacing defective items. This translates in higher costs.
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that is if the indemnity, D, is higher than legal costs, C. If D < C; instead, the
content in advertising cannot play a signaling role because the incumbent never goes
to court and advertising with a comparative claim is formally equivalent to generic
advertising.
Given that the incumbent reacts and the penalty D must be payed if quality is
low, that is with probability 1 ¡ ®1; the expected pro…t of an entrant who observes
sM and uses comparative advertising, is
¹¦E(M1)¡ (1¡ ®1)D ¡Ac: (4.9)
>From (4.9), the separating constraint for an entrant who observes sM is
¹¦E(M1)¡ (1¡ ®1)D¡Ac ¸ ¹¦E(L) (4.10)
where, again, the r.h.s. indicates expected pro…t when no advertising is made and,
thus, the entrant is perceived as a low type producer. Inequality (4.10) ensures that,
when the signal is sM ; the entrant has no interest in mimicking the state of nature
sL by using no advertising.
Given that the incumbent always …les for damages if comparative advertising is
used, the separating constraint for an entrant who observes the signal sL is
¦E (L;L) ¸ ¦E (M1; L)¡D¡Ac: (4.11)
The r.h.s. of (4.11) shows that the mimic is sanctioned by the court’s verdict and is
obliged to pay the penalty D. Inequality (4.11) gives the lower bound for comparative
advertising, which corresponds to the mimicking gain with this type of advertising:
Ac ¸ ¦E (M1; L)¡¦E (L;L)¡D (4.12)
(4.12) shows that, if the damages are large enough, the cost of signaling high qual-
ity can be zero. Whereas, with generic advertising, the lower bound of advertising
expenditure is always positive (see (4.3)).
When the incumbent always chooses ` after comparative advertising (both inequal-
ities (4.7) and (4.8) hold), putting together (4.10) and (4.11) we …nd that a separating
equilibrium of type 1 entails:
¦E (M1; L)¡¦E (L;L)¡D · Ac · ¹¦E(M1)¡ ¹¦E(L)¡ (1¡ ®1)D (4.13)
Turn now to type 2 equilibria. Recall that a type 2 equilibrium has the prop-
erty that the entrant only uses comparative advertising if the signal is sM and the
incumbent only goes to court as a response to comparative advertising if the signal
is sL. Looking for type 2 equilibrium existence conditions, then, we must replace the
constraint (4.10) by (4.1). From the above considerations (see inequality (4.6)) we
know that the constraint (4.1) is relevant only if ®1 > b®, that is if the probability of
a high quality entrant is high enough. Putting together (4.11) and (4.1) we …nd that
a separating equilibrium of the type 2 entails:
¦E (M1; L)¡¦E (L;L)¡D · Ac · ¹¦E(M1)¡ ¹¦E(L) (4.14)
Notice that the lower bound for Ac is the same in the equilibria of type 1 and of
type 2.
14
Remark 1. (a) A separating equilibrium with generic advertising (type 3) can only
exist if C.1 holds. (b) IfD > C, the existence of the equilibrium of type 3 is a su¢cient
condition for the existence of equilibria of types 1 and 2. (c) If D < C, only equilibria
of type 3 can exist (under C.1), because the incumbent does not …le for damages.
We denote by A¤g, and A¤c the minimal value for Ag and Ac respectively, as given
by the maximum among A and the lower bound de…ned by (4.3) or (4.12) as it applies.
Hence, A¤g = maxfA; bAgg and A¤c = maxfA; bAg ¡Dg.
Remark 2. Comparative advertising can signal at a lower cost than generic adver-
tising, in particular this holds when A¤g > A such that A¤g = bAg.
Proposition 1. Suppose condition C.1 holds.
(a) If D > C and ®1 · b®, there exist SPBE of type 1 with no advertising in state
sL, Ac ¸ A¤c in state sM , and where the incumbent claims for damages if comparative
advertising is used.
(b) If D > C and ®1 > b®, there exist SPBE of type 2 with no advertising in
state sL, Ac ¸ A¤c in state sM , and where the incumbent claims for damages only if
comparative advertising is used in state sL.
(c) There exist SPBE of type 3 with no advertising in state sL and Ag ¸ A¤g in
state sM
Proof: As stated above C.1 implies that (4.5) is satis…ed. Furthermore, there exist
advertising expenditures which satisfy (4.13) and (4.14). The result then follows from
above.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1 in the plane (D;®1) :
insert …gure 2 here
Note that equilibria of type 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive. Moreover, as we have
seen, if C.1 does not hold, there cannot exist a signaling role for generic advertising.
Nevertheless, there possibly exist SPBE of type 1 or 2. The next proposition provides
such existence results.
Proposition 2. Suppose condition C.1 does not hold.
(a) If D > C and ®1 · b®, there exist SPBE of type 1, provided that
[¦E (M1;H)¡¦E (L;H)]¡ [¦E (M1; L)¡¦E (L;L)] ¸ ¡D:
(b) If D > C and ®1 > b®, there exist SPBE of type 2, provided that
[¦E (M1;H)¡¦E (L;H)]¡ [¦E (M1; L)¡¦E (L;L)] ¸ ¡D
®1
:
(c) There do not exist SPBE with generic advertising.
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Proof: The conditions in (a) and (b) follow from rewriting (4.13) and (4.14),
respectively. The result then follows from above.
This means that if condition C.1 does not hold, separating equilibria with com-
parative advertising exist for damages D su¢ciently large.
Proposition 2 shows that comparative advertising can prevail over generic based
on existence results. However, when condition C.1 holds this prevalence can only
be found by use of standard equilibrium selection criteria, as shown in the following
subsection 4.2.
4.2. Reasonable beliefs and selection among separating equilibria
In this subsection we select among the di¤erent separating equilibria that can exist.
Since we are interested in knowing when generic advertising prevails over comparative
advertising (of types 1 and 2), and vice versa, we restrict attention to the case in which
condition C.1 holds (selection of pooling equilibria is analyzed in the appendix 8.1).
We base our analysis on the dominance criterion. In a given state, an action by
the entrant is dominated for a particular belief system if a di¤erent action, given the
incumbent’s (belief-based) equilibrium response to that action, leads to an increase
in the entrant’s payo¤. Roughly speaking, an equilibrium action is dominated for a
given entrant type (e.g. type L) if it is dominated in the sense just speci…ed for all
possible belief systems. According to the dominance criterion, if an equilibrium entails
beliefs attaching strictly positive probability to a strategy which is dominated for all
possible beliefs, then that equilibrium can be eliminated.
Formally, for some action (advertising) Aj by an entrant of type st, t = M;L,
denote by x the equilibrium responses by the incumbent for given beliefs attaching
strictly positive posterior probabilities to st; the set X¤(st; Aj) being de…ned as the
collection of all such elements x. Similarly let x0 denote the best responses to action
A0k, with k = c; g. Net pro…ts of the entrant are denoted by ¼E.
De…nition 2. An action Aj , is strictly dominated for type st if there exists an action
A0k, such that
min
x02X¤(st;A0k)
¼E(A
0
k; x
0; st) > max
x2X¤(st;Aj)
¼E(Aj ; x; st) (4.15)
Denote S¤(Aj) = fstj@A0k that satis…es (4.15)g. A SPBE then satis…es the dom-
inance criterion if for all actions Aj with S¤(Aj) 6= ; the posterior belief of st upon
observing Aj is strictly positive only if st 2 S¤(Aj).
Lemma 1. (a) Equilibria of type 1 or type 2 with Ac > A¤c in state sM do not satisfy
the dominance criterion.
(b) Equilibria of type 3 with Ag > A¤g in state s1 do not satisfy the dominance
criterion.
Loosely speaking this means that only the least-cost signals can be undominated.
Note that result (a) alone is su¢cient to ensure that there is at most one separating
SPBE that satis…es the dominance criterion if condition C.1 is violated.
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Lemma 2. Suppose A < A¤g. If a SPBE of type 2 exists, SPBE of type 3 do not
satisfy the dominance criterion.
Proof: Posterior beliefs which are consistent with the dominance criterion have
the property that upon observing A¤c or A¤g the entrant is believed to be of quality
M1. Gross of advertising expenditures, the equilibrium pro…ts following these two
advertising strategies are the same. Since A¤c ¡ A¤g = ¡minfA¤g ¡ A;Dg < 0 the
entrant obtains higher pro…ts with comparative advertising. Therefore, SPBE of type
3 do not satisfy the dominance criterion.
As a comment on the last result, even if consumers are not informed about the
incumbent’s legal actions and about the court’s verdict, comparative advertising is
more e¢cient in terms of advertising expenditures than generic advertising. This
always holds when the conditions for the existence of equilibria of type 2 are veri…ed.
The selection between equilibria of type 1 and 3 is less straightforward. The reason
is that damages a¤ect the expected payo¤ of the entrant. In the dominant equilibrium
with comparative advertising of type 1 the entrant’s expected pro…ts are:
®1¦E(M1;H) + (1¡ ®1)(¦E(M1; L)¡D)¡A¤c :
These pro…ts have to be compared to expected pro…ts using generic advertising (taking
the least-cost equilibrium of type 3):
®1¦E(M1;H) + (1¡ ®1)¦E(M1; L)¡A¤g
The di¤erence between these two terms is positive if
D < (A¤g ¡A)=(1¡ ®): (4.16)
If damages to be paid are lower than the threshold given above, then the entrant’s
expected pro…ts under generic are lower than under comparative advertising of type
1. Low damages therefore make comparative advertising of type 1 more attractive
than generic. In particular, if the advertising needed to satisfy the entrant’s incentive
constraint, ¦E(M1; L)¡¦E(L;L)¡D exceeds the technological constraint A the least-
cost equilibrium of type 1 is more attractive for the entrant than the corresponding
equilibrium of type 3, independent of ®1.13
Lemma 3. Whenever SPBE of type 1 and type 3 coexist, type 3 equilibria do not
satisfy the dominance criterion if (4.16) holds. Type 1 equilibria do not satisfy the
dominance criterion if the reverse of (4.16) holds.
Putting the above results together, we always …nd a unique SPBE among all
separating SPBE that satis…es the dominance criterion provided that C.1 holds (and
that non-negativity of pro…ts constraints are satis…ed).
13Notice that, in this latter case, the di¤erence between the entrant’s expected pro…t with type 1
equilibrium and expected pro…t with type 3 equilibrium reduces to ®1D; thus it is maximal when
the signal is perfectly informative (¸ = 0 that implies ®1 = 1) and falls to zero when the signal is
non-informative (¸ = 1 that implies ®1 = ®0):
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Proposition 3. Suppose C.1 holds, then in the parameter regions such that expected
pro…ts are non-negative, there exists a unique SPBE within the set of separating SPBE
that satis…es the dominance criterion:
(1) If D > C and (D¡A¤g +A)=D < ®1 < b® it is of type 1;
(2) If D > C and ®1 > b® it is of type 2;
(3) If D · C or ®1 < (D ¡A¤g +A)=D it is of type 3.
Figure 3 and 4 illustrate the proposition 3 respectively when A¤g ¡ D > A and
A¤g ¡D < A.
insert …gure 3 and 4 here
4.3. An example with horizontal di¤erentiation
The analysis rests on some assumptions. The purpose of this subsection is to present
an example where they are all met. Assume that the incumbent is a …rm located
at point 0 in the Hotelling linear city of unit length, with the consumer population
distributed according to the uniform distribution of unit mass. Further, assume that
each consumer buys one unit at most of the indivisible, di¤erentiated good. The
transportation costs are linear, and the unit transport cost is t. The entrant can only
enter at point 1. Therefore after entry the …rms play a noncooperative and one-shot
price game. A consumer located at point x in [0; 1] obtains utility uxI = r+µH¡tx¡pI
if she purchases the good from the incumbent at price pI . The sum r + µH is the
maximum reservation price (surplus) when pI = x = 0 for the high quality good
produced by the incumbent. Similarly, the expected utility from buying at price pE
from the entrant is uxE = r + µq
e
E ¡ t(1¡ x)¡ pE, where qeE is the expected surplus
obtained from purchase from the entrant given beliefs on quality. Suppose that r is
su¢ciently high so that the whole market is covered in equilibrium. After entry, and
having observed the two prices, consumer ~x is indi¤erent between buying from the
incumbent or the entrant, and
~x =
2t+ pE ¡ pI + µ(H ¡ qeE)
2t
:
Note that µ(H ¡ qeE) is the additional surplus of the incumbent’s product due to the
perceived quality di¤erence. Let the cost function be cj(qj)x, for j = E; I where qj
is the true quality. Suppose that costs are known by the …rms. Then the solution for
the incumbent pro…ts, ¼I ; and for the entrant’s, ¼E gives
¼I(q
e
E; qE) =
(3t+ cE(qE)¡ cI(qI) + µ(H ¡ qeE))2
18t
;
¼E(q
e
E; qE) =
(3t¡ cE(qE) + cI(qI)¡ µ(H ¡ qeE))2
18t
:
It is easy to check that A.1 and A.2 are met. Note that, in general, also the incum-
bent’s pro…ts depend on the entrant’s quality and not only on the consumers’ beliefs
with respect to this quality.
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Furthermore, C.1 is met if dcE(qE)=dqE · 0 because @2¼E=@qeE@qE = ¡(µ=9t)(dcE(qE)=dqE).
This means that costs are non-increasing in quality. Hence, in this adverse selection
world higher, correctly perceived quality is good news for two reasons: the consumers
willingness to pay is higher and production costs are lower. In terms of the R&D
vocabulary, a higher consumer willingness to pay due to higher quality stems from
product innovation. Lower costs because of higher quality stem from process inno-
vation. Hence, in the present example condition C.1 holds if process and product
innovations go hand-in-hand.
5. Belief revision after the legal outcome
To focus on the role of consumer expectations, we assume in this section that con-
sumers observe (i) the incumbent’s reaction and (ii) the court’s verdict. Type 1 and
type 2 equilibria exist in model B too. As opposed to model A, note that the incum-
bent’s strategy choice here is an explicit argument of the consumers’ belief revision
function. At an equilibrium of type 1 this does not imply that the action of the incum-
bent is informative per se: it leads to more information being di¤used only because the
court intervenes, as it shall be described in the sequel. By contrast, at an equilibrium
of type 2 (where the court shall not intervene), the observation that the incumbent
does not react against comparison claims con…rms that the entrant has not tried to
cheat consumers. If the incumbent reacted, that would mean that there has been a
deviation from the equilibrium path by the entrant. As for point (ii) we assume that
the court does not take into account the signal received by the …rms, since they both
have incentives to manipulate their reports. It collects (incomplete) evidence and
declares whether the advertising was misleading making use of this evidence. Firms
cannot take any action after the verdict. The evidence in court is also observed by
the …rms, who do not gain more information after that. It is common knowledge that
the court can make mistakes due to imperfect evidence gathering; however, as a net
result the verdict improves consumers’ information about the entrant’s quality at a
separating equilibrium of type 1, as we shall see in the appendix 8.2. In this setup
damages needed to make comparison advertising viable is reduced. Indeed, it is even
possible to have D = 0.
Introducing the court’s imprecise veri…cation process adds an additional dimension
to the problem, as explained below. We assume that with probability 1¡¹ the court
does not discover a false claim, i.e. a claim coming from type-L in either state sL or
sM . A claim from an entrant of underlying quality H is never falsi…ed by the court.
In short, the court does not always uncover veri…able evidence against a low quality
entrant, while it accepts veri…able evidence. Therefore, by assumption the entrant
does not pay damages if its true, yet unknown, quality is high.14
Consumers know that with probability 1¡¹ a low quality entrant who uses com-
parative advertising is not unmasked by the court. As a consequence, when observing
14This is in line with the information received by the …rms. Firms and the court recognize certain
failures. One could also analyze the model under the assumption that the court can take as wrong
a true claim. Our main results remain valid under this di¤erent assumption. Important is that the
court’s action reveals additional information.
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a verdict in favor of the entrant, consumers update their beliefs on the entrant’s
quality taking the possible mistake by the court into account.
As before, at a separating equilibrium comparative advertising is chosen only if
the signal received is sM and not sL: We call ®2 the updated probability to face a
high quality entrant when the court’s verdict, denoted bq, claims that quality is high:15
®2 = prob(q = Hjbq = H) = ®1=[1¡ ¹(1¡ ®1)]:
Obviously ®2 > ®1. Correspondingly, 1 ¡ ®2 = prob(q = Ljbq = H) is such that
1 ¡ ®2 < 1 ¡ ®1. Accordingly, uncertainty about quality is reduced if the court is
called to act after the …rms receive signal sM . This contrasts with the case in which
the court is called to intervene when the entrant cheats (out-of-equilibrium) in state
sL: in that case the court can wrongly rule in favor of the entrant. The latter pays
damages with a probability that is less than 1 and is increasing in the court’s precision.
At a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the entrant signals sM with
a non-negative amount of comparative advertising and the incumbent reacts by suing
the entrant consumers revise beliefs concerning quality to
M2 = ®2H + (1¡ ®2)L > M1:
It is important to recall at every stage that M2 is the up-dated quality when con-
sumers observe comparative advertising only if followed by a verdict (namely only in
equilibria of type 1). The analysis of generic advertising is unchanged with respect to
model A.
We will analyze how parameters ®1 and ¹ a¤ect equilibrium outcomes. We shall
concentrate in the main text on the analysis of equilibrium of type 2, while a detailed
analysis of equilibrium of type 1 is performed in appendix 8.2.16 In our view the
di¤erence between model A and model B is more apparent in type 2 equilibria than
in type 1. In the context of model B, in type 2 equilibria the incumbent uses di¤erent
strategies against comparison ads in state sM (no-reaction) and sL (reaction) and
therefore consumers rely upon both …rms’ actions in their interpretation of comparison
advertising as a signal. In type 1 equilibria, the incumbent uses the same strategy
(reacts) against comparison ads whether the signal is sM or sL, consumers beliefs only
hinge upon the entrant’s strategy (and, in case of comparison ads, upon the court’s
verdict).
At an equilibrium of type 2 the incumbent does not …le for damages in state sM
and it does in state sL.
Lemma 4. (a) The incumbent …les for damages after receiving signal sL if
¹ ¸ ¹I1 ´
¦I (M1; L)¡¦I (M2; L) +C
¦I (L;L)¡¦I (M2; L) +D : (5.1)
15 Indeed prob(bq = LjsM ) = ¹prob(LjsM ) = ¹(1 ¡ ®1) and prob(bq = HjsM ) = 1¡prob(bq =
LjsM ) = 1¡ ¹(1¡ ®1):
16Like in the …rst model, to support an equilibrium of type 1 rather than 2 requires that the
probability that the product is of high quality has to be low.
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(b) The incumbent does not …le for damages after receiving signal sM if
¹ · ¹I2(®1) ´
µ
1
1¡ ®1
¶µ ¹¦I(M1)¡ ¹¦I(M2) +C
¦I (L;L)¡¦I (M2; L) +D
¶
:
Proof: Note that the beliefs are such that if the incumbent does not sue the
entrant after comparison ads, the entrant is believed to be of quality M1. This
corresponds to what was established in model A where there is no further updating
after observing the advertising policy. The condition for the incumbent to react to
comparative advertising in state sL is:
¹ [¦I (L;L) +D] + (1¡ ¹)¦I (M2; L)¡C ¸ ¦I (M1; L) (5.2)
Which is equivalent to ¹ ¸ ¹I1 in the lemma.
(b) Consider now state sM . The incumbent bene…ts from winning the case because
it receives damages and it enjoys a stronger position in the market in case the court
unmasks a low quality entrant. However, the incumbent obtains a decrease in pro…ts
if the court’s verdict is favorable to the entrant. In fact, in that case, consumers
up-dated beliefs areM2 instead ofM1. Formally the constraint for the incumbent not
to react to comparative advertising in state sM reads:
¹¦I(M1) ¸ ®1¦I (M2;H)+(1¡ ®1) [¹(¦I (L;L)+D)+(1¡¹)¦I (M2; L)]¡C (5.3)
Condition (5.3) reduces to ¹ · ¹I2(®1).
Note that ¹I1 > 0 so that if the court’s precision is too low (¹ < ¹I1) the incum-
bent’s reaction in state sL cannot be supported. Note also that ¹I1 < 1 is implied by
D > C. In words, if damages paid at least cover legal costs the incumbent reacts in
state sL if the court’s precision is su¢ciently high (¹ > ¹I1).
Note also that, if damages paid exceed legal costs one can always …nd values
for ®1 such that the critical ¹I2(®1) is between zero and 1 (note incidentally that
¹I2(0) = ¹I1 and that a su¢cient condition for ¹I2(®1) > ¹I1 is that C.1 holds also
for the incumbent’s pro…ts).
Reasoning along the same lines as in section 4, the separation constraint for
an entrant that receives signal sL is identical in type 1 and in type 2 equilibria:17
¦E (L;L) ¸ ¹ [¦E (L;L)¡D] + (1 ¡ ¹)¦E (M2; L) ¡ Ac. As it appears, in the
separation constraint a mimic gets ¦E (L;L) if the court uncovers the truth and
¦E (M2; L) if it does not. This can be rewritten as
Ac ¸ (1¡ ¹) [¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (L;L)]¡ ¹D (5.4)
so that the minimum amount of advertising expenditure necessary to separate is:18
A¤¤c ´ maxfA; (1¡ ¹) [¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (L;L)]¡ ¹Dg (5.5)
17Without the assumption that the court can make mistakes, that is when ¹ = 1, the separation
constraint for a low type would be: ¦E(L;L) ¸ ¦E(L;L)¡D¡Ac: The constraint reads Ac ¸ ¡D; so
that it does not give any restriction on the amount of comparative advertising required.
18>From the analysis in the appendix 8.2 it follows that the minimum amount of advertising
needed is the same as for an equilibrium of type 1.
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Lemma 5. For the interval of admissible comparative advertising expenditures to be
non-empty with separating SPBE of type 2 one must have
(1¡ ¹)[¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (L;L)]¡ ¹D · ¹¦E (M1)¡ ¹¦E (L) (5.6)
Proof: The entrant after receiving the signal sM ; uses comparative advertising
when the incumbent chooses a; if ®1¦E (M1;H) + (1¡®1)¦E (M1; L)¡Ac is larger
than ®1¦E (L;H) + (1¡ ®1)¦E (L;L), which can be rewritten as
Ac · ¹¦E(M1)¡ ¹¦E(L) (5.7)
Note that the above condition is equivalent to (4.1) and that, under condition (C.1),
the r.h.s. is strictly larger than ¦E (M1; L)¡¦E (L;L). Combining conditions (5.4)
and (5.7) gives comparative advertising expenditures that are compatible with the
incentive constraints of the entrant for equilibria of type 2.
For a given ®1, the condition in the lemma is satis…ed if the precision of the court’s
verdict is su¢ciently high. Let¢ = [¦E(M1;H)¡¦E (L;H)]+[¦E(M1; L)¡¦E(L;L)].
Then the inequality ¹ ¸ ¹E(®1) must hold, where
¹E(®1) ´
¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (M1; L)¡ ®1¢
¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (L;L) +D :
Under condition (C.1) we could use a stronger condition which is independent of ®1,
¹ ¸ ¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (M1; L)
¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (L;L) +D
Note that the critical ¹E(®1) 2 (0; 1). Also, higher damages lower the value of ¹E(®1).
Proposition 4. Suppose A < A¤¤c . If ®1 and ¹ are such that ¹I2(®1) ¸ ¹ ¸
maxf¹I1 ; ¹E(®1)g then there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of type 2 with
Ac = A¤¤c .
Proof follows from the analysis above.
Like in the analysis performed in section 4, here too the minimum amount of
expenditure necessary to separate in the case of generic advertising in state sL corre-
sponds to: A¤g = maxfA; bAgg:
Comparing A¤g and A¤¤c it is clear that comparative advertising (in the payo¤-
dominant SPBE of type 1 or 2) is less costly than generic advertising provided that
A · A¤c and ¹ is su¢ciently high. As in the previous section we can use the dominance
criterion to select the comparative advertising separating equilibrium of type 2 when
also equilibria of type 3 exist, based on the value of ¹ among other things.
Note that in model A of section 4, comparative advertising can cost less than
generic only if D > 0. In the present model this can happen if
(1¡ ¹) [¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (L;L)]¡ ¹D < ¦E (M1; L)¡¦E (L;L) (5.8)
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Two e¤ects arise in this model: the …rst is the “double upgrading” e¤ect by which in
the l.h.s. of the inequality M2 appears in place of M1. This increases the mimicking
gain for the entrant in state sL and raises the cost of comparative advertising. The
second e¤ect is due to the presence of the court, which can unmask a false claim, and
is re‡ected in the term ¹. If ¹ increases the cost of comparative advertising decreases.
If this e¤ect is strong enough comparative advertising may cost less than generic even
if D = 0. When D = 0 the minimum amount of advertising in a type 2 equilibrium
is
A¤c0 ´ (1¡ ¹)[¦E(M2; L)¡¦E(L;L)]:
When A¤g exceeds A the payo¤ dominant equilibrium of type 2 payo¤ dominates the
equilibrium of type 3 if it entails a lower cost of advertising, i.e. if A¤c0 < bAg , or
¹ >
¦E(M2; L)¡¦E(M1; L)
¦E(M2; L)¡¦E(L;L) :
This shows the role of court’s verdict, and clari…es the di¤erence between the present
model and the …rst model.
6. Imperfectly correlated information
So far we have assumed that the information of the two …rms was perfectly correlated.
However, suppose that this is not the case. For instance, each …rm independently
undertakes a single or a series of tests providing some imprecise knowledge about the
entrant’s product quality. The result of the testing is private information of the …rm
carrying it, so that the total information in the market is richer than the individual
information initially obtained by the …rms. We show here that in such an environment,
the general insight that comparative advertising can be a more e¢cient way to signal
product quality than generic dissipative advertising retains its power. Note that the
analysis of generic dissipative advertising remains unchanged. To analyze comparative
advertising we maintain that consumers observe all …rms’ actions and the court verdict
(model B). We shall make two additional observations. First, we show here that there
exist equilibria in which the entrant signals its information to the incumbent and both
…rms signal information that is favorable for the entrant’s product to the consumers.
This implies that consumers obtain more than the information initially available to
either …rm, but less than the pooled information. Second, we show that there exist
separating equilibria, like those of type 2 above, where claiming for damages occurs
only if the incumbent receives signal sL so that it knows that the quality of the entrant
is low.19
We will …rst specify the changes in the model and then present the analysis. To
clarify the exposition we consider the special case that the court perfectly veri…es the
entrant’s quality (i.e. ¹ = 1 in our notation). Hence, if the incumbent applies for
damages no uncertainty with respect to the entrant’s quality remains. The modi…ca-
tion of the model concerns the way in which …rms initially receive information about
19After signal sM , and comparative advertising, the incumbent does not react and by doing so
reveals to consumers that the entrant is “strong”.
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the entrant’s product quality. A test carried out by …rm i can show the failure of
the entrant’s product. In this case the signal for …rm i is siL and it reveals that the
product is of low quality. If the test does not show a failure, the signal for …rm i is
siM . It reveals that it is more likely that the product is of high quality. Hence if the
true state is H …rms receive signals sIM and s
E
M , respectively. On the other hand, if
the true state is L …rms receive signals sIM and s
E
M with probability ¸
2, signals sIM
and sEL with probability ¸(1 ¡ ¸), signals sIL and sEM with probability ¸(1¡ ¸), and
signals sIL and s
E
L with probability (1¡ ¸)2. This information structure implies that
the information that the two …rms receive is positively but not perfectly correlated.
Furthermore, the probability a …rm assigns to the entrant being a high type if the
private signal is sM is again ®1 =
®0
®0 + ¸ (1¡ ®0) , as in the previous sections.
We focus on the following type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (type 2-bis):
De…nition 3. equilibrium of type 2-bis
- If the entrant receives sEM it chooses c; if the entrant receives s
E
L it chooses n
(does not advertise).
- If the incumbent receives sIM it chooses a, while if it receives s
I
L it chooses `,
claiming for damages, in case the entrant has used c.
- The separating beliefs must be consistent with strategies, of a type 2 equilibrium,
such that: prob(c j (sIj ; sEL)) = 0, prob(c j (sIj ; sEM)) = 1; while prob(` j (sIM ; sEj )) = 0
and prob(` j (sIL; sEj )) = 1; for j =M;L.
In this type of equilibrium the belief updating is as follows: observing comparative
advertising by the entrant the incumbent learns that the entrant has received signal
sEM . If the incumbent claims for damages the true quality is then revealed by the
court to consumers.20 This only happens if the incumbent has received signal sIL in
which case the true state is L. If the entrant uses comparative advertising and the
incumbent does not sue the entrant, consumers interpret this as both …rms having
received siM and update their beliefs to
®
0
1 =
®0
®0 + ¸
2(1¡ ®0)
> ®1.
The expected product quality then is M
0
1 = ®
0
1H + (1¡ ®
0
1)L.
With these preliminaries we are now in the position to write down the incumbent’s
and entrant’s separating constraints that have to be satis…ed to support a type 2-bis
equilibrium. If the entrant receives signal sL the incumbent receives signal sM and
does not react with probability ¸. The incentive constraint of the entrant that receives
20The fact that consumers know the …nal verdict of the court is not essential for the argument. If
consumers only observed the …rms’ actions but not the …nal vedict of the court we would obtain the
same insights although under modi…ed conditions that are derived from the separating constraints.
In that case at a separating equilibrium it is also the case that consumers’ beliefs are such that
prob(sM j `) = prob(sM j (sIL; sEM )) = 0. In particular, the following point still holds: under some
parameter restriction there exist equilibria such that consumers when making the purchasing decision
are better informed than the entrant at the point of making its advertising expenditure.
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signal sEL is ¦E (L;L) ¸ (1¡¸) [¦E (L;L)¡D] +¸¦E
³
M
0
1; L
´
¡Ac:Which provides
the lower bound for Ac as
Ac ¸ ¸[¦E
³
M
0
1; L
´
¡¦E (L;L)]¡ (1¡ ¸)D (6.1)
Note that this inequality is similar to (5.4); only the probability of the court to make
a mistake, 1¡ ¹, has been replaced by the probability ¸, and the updated value for
M is now M
0
1.
When the entrant receives the signal sM it expects the incumbent’s signal to be sM
with probability ®1 + (1¡ ®1)¸. Therefore it expects a comparative claim to trigger
a lawsuit with probability (1¡ ¸)(1¡ ®1). Meanwhile, consumers update quality to
M
0
1, based upon ®
0
1 de…ned above, if the incumbent does not react to a comparison
ad, while the information of the entrant is still only based upon ®1. Accordingly, the
separation constraint for the entrant after it receives signal sEM is:
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®1¦E
³
M
0
1;H
´
+(1¡®1)
n
(1¡ ¸) [¦E (L;L)¡D] + ¸¦E
³
M
0
1; L
´o
¡Ac ¸ ®1 ¹¦E(L)
This gives the upper bound for Ac as equal to
Ac · ®1[¦E(M 01;H)¡¦E(L;H)]+¸(1¡®1)[¦E
³
M
0
1; L
´
¡¦E (L;L)]¡(1¡¸)(1¡®1)D:
(6.2)
Hence from (6.1) and (6.2), there exist comparative advertising expenditures that are
consistent with the entrant’s incentive constraints if
[¦E(M
0
1;H)¡¦E(L;H)]¡ ¸[¦E
³
M
0
1; L
´
¡¦E (L;L)] ¸ ¡(1¡ ¸)D: (6.3)
This condition has the same structure as condition (5.4) in the previous subsec-
tion and is always satis…ed if condition (C.1) holds—although C.1 is not necessary.
Now let us turn to the incumbent’s separating constraints. Suppose the entrant uses
comparative advertising. If the incumbent receives signal sIL it claims for damages if
¦I(L;L) +D ¡C ¸ ¦I(M 01; L): (6.4)
This inequality is automatically satis…ed if D ¸ C. If the incumbent receives signal
sIM it can update according to ®
0
1, as for consumers who observe that the incumbent
does not …le for damages. Therefore the incumbent does not claim for damages if
®
0
1¦I(M
0
1;H) + (1¡ ®
0
1)¦I(M10 ; L) ¸ ®
0
1¦I(H;H) + (1¡ ®
0
1)(¦I(L;L) +D)¡C:
This inequality can be rewritten as
®
0
1[¦I(M
0
1;H)¡¦I(H;H)] + (1¡ ®
0
1)[¦I(M
0
1; L)¡¦I(L;L)¡D] +C ¸ 0: (6.5)
21Note that this inequality is similar to (8.2) in appendix 8.2. (8.2) indicates the separation con-
straint for an entrant which observed signal sM when equilibrium is of type 1. Again the probability
of the court to make a mistake, 1¡ ¹, has been replaced by the probability ¸.
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For C > 0 this inequality is satis…ed if ®
0
1 is su¢ciently large which is implied by
¸ su¢ciently small. (Note that for a given ®0 the inequality is satis…ed for all ¸ if
®0[¦I(M0;H)¡ ¦I(H;H)] + (1 ¡ ®0) [¦I(M0; L)¡ ¦I(L;L)¡D] + C ¸ 0.) Sum-
marizing, to support a type 2-bis equilibrium conditions (6.3), (6.4), and (6.5) have
to be satis…ed. The minimum amount of advertising necessary to separate is
A¤¤¤c ´ maxfA;¸[¦E
³
M
0
1; L
´
¡¦E (L;L)]¡ (1¡ ¸)Dg:
Proposition 5. Suppose A · A¤¤¤c . If D ¸ C and parameters ¸ and ®0 are such
that (6.5) and (6.3) holds then there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of type
2-bis with Ac = A¤¤¤c .
Note that the expression for A¤¤¤c is just the same as that for A¤¤c in the case of
the court making mistakes, with ¸ = (1¡ ¹).
Clearly type 2-bis is not the only type of equilibrium that can arise. There exist
parameter constellations such that the incumbent claims for damages whenever the
entrant uses comparative advertising (type 1-bis equilibrium). In this case, since the
court veri…es the entrant’s quality, consumers learn the entrant’s true quality when
the entrant received signal sEM , that is comparative advertising always allows perfect
information disclosure.
7. Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that comparative advertising has a di¤erent signaling
potential than generic advertising. In particular, comparison ads may trigger a re-
action (possibly only o¤ the equilibrium path) by the …rm that is the target of the
comparison. This may be especially useful for …rms wishing to enter a market in
which an incumbent with a renown brand already operates.
We use two di¤erent versions of a model. These versions represent di¤erent pos-
sible legal and technical set-ups. In the …rst version there is no problem of ex-post
veri…ability of comparison claims (the court does not make mistakes), but consumers
are not warned o¤ if a misleading advertising is made, so that they are exposed to
the risk of a wrong purchase. In the second model the court does not always discover
a false claim. Consumers, however, observe whether there is a legal action against
the entrant’s comparison ads and what the court’s (imperfect) …ndings are. Here,
under some parameter constellations the observed action by the incumbent reveals
the information that the …rms have received and therefore consumers update their
beliefs upon observing the incumbent’s action.
In the two models comparison ads and generic ads can be used in equilibrium.
Our results show that comparison ads are often preferred because they enable a legal
action against the entrant so that the cost of cheating through a comparative ad is
higher. This implies that the entrant’s incentive constraint is relaxed. Thus lower
advertising expenditures support the signaling mechanism.
The model is also extended to allow for imperfect correlation between the signals
received by the two …rms. In this extension the role of the observability of the actions
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taken by the incumbent is further emphasized. There, when the incumbent does not
react to a comparison advertisement reveals that he too, and not only the entrant,
has received a good signal about the entrant’s quality.
Not to take an action can reveal important information, as readers of detective
stories may kn ow. In Con an Doyle’s “ Silver Blaze” inspector Gregory and Sherlo ck
Holmes hold the following conversation: “Is there any point to which you would wish to
draw my attention?”, “to the curious incident of the dog in the night-time”. “The dog
did nothing in the night-time.” “That was the curious incident”, remarked Sherlock
Holmes.
8. Appendix
8.1. Pooling equilibria
To characterize all pure strategy SPBE we also have to consider pooling equilibria.
These can be of several types. We refer here to the case where consumers do not
observe the incumbent’s action and the court’s decision (model A). We check wether
pooling equilibria can survive the application of selection criteria, like dominance
or the intuitive criterion. The analysis shall show the relative weakness of pooling
equilibria. Equilibrium beliefs may be characterized by the following two statements
taken together: (i) if the entrant spends at least Pg ¸ 0 in generic, or Pc ¸ 0 in
comparative advertising then the quality is believed to be ®0H + (1¡ ®0)L, namely
consumers do not revise their beliefs; (ii) if the expenditure is lower than the thresholds
Pg or Pc then the quality is believed to be L.22 The pooling equilibrium with minimum
cost for the entrant is one where Pg = Pc = 0, the entrant never advertises, and
consumers beliefs are never up-dated. We shall limit the analysis to this minimum
cost equilibrium, which is also the more resistant to selection. In a pooling equilibrium
of this type the incumbent (respectively: the entrant) receives pro…ts ¦I(M0; L) in
state sL (respectively ¦E(M0; L)) and ®1¦j(M0;H) + (1 ¡ ®1)¦J(M0; L) in state
sM , for j 2 fE; Ig.
For comparative advertising with expenditure A¤c consumer beliefs are such that
expected quality is M1.
If we accept the stronger re…nement of the intuitive criterion (see Cho and Kreps,
1987) we can select the unique SPBE characterized in Proposition 3. Indeed, the
entrant that receives signal sL cannot pro…t from a deviation to A¤c , given that
it receives pro…ts ¦E(M1; L) ¡ A¤c ¡ D instead of the equilibrium pro…ts given by
¦E(M0; L). Substituting for A¤c this reduces to the inequality ¦E(L;L) < ¦E(M0; L),
which is true by assumption A.1. For generic advertising the condition writes as
¦E(M1; L)¡A¤g ¸ ¦E(M0; L), which again can be reduced to ¦E(L;L) < ¦E(M0; L).
It follows:
22More generally, one could further re…ne the belief system adding to point (i) and (ii) the thresh-
olds P
0
g > Pg and P
0
c > Pc leading to a perceived quality, q
0; with q
0
> ®0H + (1 ¡ ®0)L, but
su¢ciently low so as to ensure that separation between state sL and sM is less pro…table for the
entrant than pooling using Pg or Pc.
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Lemma 6. Whether C.1 holds or does not hold, pooling equilibria do not satisfy the
intuitive criterion.
Consider now the application of dominance. First, consider parameter constella-
tions such that separating SPBE of type 2 exist. Pooling equilibria do not satisfy the
dominance criterion if the pro…ts to the entrant receiving signal sM satisfy
¹¦E(M1)¡A¤c ¸ ®1¦E(M0;H) + (1¡ ®1)¦E(M0; L):
Suppose that A < A¤c . Then the above condition becomes D ¸ ®1¦E(M0;H) +
(1¡ ®1)¦E(M0; L) ¡ ¹¦E(M1) + ¦E(M1; L)¡¦E(L;L). This can be rewritten as
D ¸ ®1f¦E(M1; L)¡¦E(M0; L)¡¦E(M1;H)+¦E(M0;H)g+¦E(M0; L)¡¦E(L;L):
Under C.1 one has ¦E(M1;H)¡¦E(M0;H) ¸ ¦E(M1; L)¡¦E(M0; L). Then it
follows:
Lemma 7. Suppose C.1 is met and A < A¤c . Then pooling equilibria do not satisfy
the dominance criterion for parameters such that SPBE of type 2 exist under the
condition that
D ¸ ¦E(M0; L)¡¦E(L;L):
Second, consider parameter constellations such that separating SPBE of type 1
exist. Pooling equilibria do not satisfy the intuitive criterion if
¹¦E(M1)¡A¤c ¡ (1¡ ®1)D ¸ ®1¦E(M0;H) + (1¡ ®1)¦E(M0; L)
We rewrite the above inequality as
®1D ¸ (¦E(M1; L)¡¦E(L;L))¡ ®1(¦E(M1;H)¡¦E(M0;H))
¡(1¡ ®1)(¦E(M1; L)¡¦E(M0; L)) (8.1)
Lemma 8. Suppose C.1 holds and A < A¤c . Then pooling equilibria do not satisfy
the dominance criterion for parameters such that SPBE of type 1 exist under the
condition that
D ¸ ¦E(M0; L)¡¦E(L;L)
®1
:
The above results show that for certain parameter values pooling equilibria do not
satisfy the dominance criterion. Note that the conditions derived in Proposition 1
and the above Lemmas are not mutually exclusive.
8.2. Analysis of equilibria of type 1 when consumers observe the court’s
verdict
The e¤ect on consumers’ belief revision at an equilibrium of type 1 is stronger than
in model A. In this setup, the court’s verdict after signal sM works as a certi…cation,
albeit as an imperfect one.
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Consider the incumbent incentive to react in state sM . Recalling discussion in
section 5 and inequality (5.3), the constraint for the incumbent to react to comparative
advertising in state sM reduces to ¹ ¸ ¹I2(®1).
Consider now the separating constraint for the entrant. Given that the incumbent
reacts if the signal is sM , an entrant who learns that the signal is sM uses comparative
advertising if:
®1¦E (M2;H) + (1¡ ®1) f¹ [¦E (L;L)¡D] + (1¡ ¹)¦E (M2; L)g ¡Ac ¸ ¹¦E(L)
(8.2)
In the case of no damages (namely D = 0) constraint (8.2) reduces to impose
as an upper bound for Ac the value ®1 [¦E (M2;H)¡¦E (L;H)] + (1 ¡ ®1)(1 ¡
¹) [¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (L;L)]. Hence, provided that condition (C.1) holds, even if no
damages are paid, as in equilibrium of type 2, there exists a non-empty interval for
comparative advertising expenditures that satis…es the incentive constraints of the
entrant.
The condition for comparative advertising expenditure which is compatible with
the entrant’s separating constraints (combining (5.4) and (8.2)) is
(1¡ ¹) [¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (L;L)]¡ ¹D · Ac
· ®1 [¦E (M2;H)¡¦E (L;H)] + (1¡ ®1) (1¡ ¹) [¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (L;L)]¡ ¹(1¡ ®1)D
(8.3)
Hence, the condition that there exists comparative advertising expenditures which
are compatible with the entrant’s separating constraints is
¦E (M2;H)¡¦E (L;H)¡ (1¡ ¹) [¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (L;L)] + ¹D ¸ 0: (8.4)
This condition is automatically satis…ed if condition (C.1) holds. Again, we observe
that (C.1) is not necessary to satisfy the separating constraints of the entrant. Only
in the limit, as ¹ turns to zero condition (8.4) becomes equivalent to C.1. This is
the limit case, in which the court system is useless in that it does not uncover any
evidence so that advertising that contains content is equivalent to generic advertising.
In the opposite case when ¹ = 1 the court perfectly veri…es and condition (8.4) is
always satis…ed. We rewrite this condition as a lower bound on ¹:
¹ ¸ ¹E ´
[¦E(M2; L)¡¦E(L;L)]¡ [¦E(M2;H)¡¦E(L;H)]
¦E(M2; L)¡¦E(L;L) +D
Summarizing, to support a type 1 equilibrium the conditions (8.4), (5.1), and
¹ ¸ ¹I2(®1) have to be satis…ed. The minimum amount of advertising expenditure
necessary to separate is: A¤¤c ´ maxfA; (1¡ ¹) [¦E (M2; L)¡¦E (L;L)]¡ ¹Dg
Proposition 6. SupposeA < A¤¤c . If ®1and ¹ are such that ¹ ¸ maxf¹E; ¹I1 ; ¹I2(®1)g
then there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of type 1 with Ac = A¤¤c .
Proof The existence of a SPBE follows from above.
Note that the equilibrium of type 1 allows more information disclosure than that
of type 2. In fact, if quality is signaled with generic advertising or with comparative
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advertising in equilibrium of type 2, consumers only learn that average (updated)
quality isM1. While, if quality is signaled with comparative advertising in equilibrium
of type 1, when the court says that the claim is true (bq = H), consumers updated
beliefs on quality areM2 > M1. Thus, comparative claims followed by a court decision
transmit more information to consumers than generic ads or comparative ads without
the incumbent’s reaction.
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